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    性爱网站 学术讲座——丁弋川教授

    发布者:殳妮   发布时间:2025-05-30   浏览次数:39


    时间Time: 2025年6月9日上午9:00 (09:00 AM, 9 June, 2025)

    地点Venue: 东校区财科馆317会议室(Room 317, E&F Hall, East Campus)

    题目Title: Multi-Listing for Horizontally Differentiated Services

    作者Authors: Zhou Chen, Yichuan Ding, Luyi Yang

    摘要Abstract: This paper studies a queueing system with horizontally differentiated servers. Each customer decides whether to join the queues of multiple servers simultaneously (“multi-list”), join the queue exclusively served by her preferred server, or balk. Such a multi-listing system contrasts a single-listing system, which allows for server choice but prohibits multi-listing, and a pooling system, which precludes server choice by requiring every joining customer to multi-list.

    We build queueing-game-theoretic models of the three systems above and compare their throughput and social welfare in equilibrium. Between a single-listing system and a pooling system, the former better facilitates matching between customers and servers, whereas the latter excels at reducing waiting time through load balancing. Accordingly, we find that either system can outperform the other in either throughput or social welfare. One may expect the multi-listing system to beat both single-listing and pooling as it marries the matching value of the former with the operational advantage of the latter. We find that multi-listing indeed outperforms pooling in both throughput and social welfare. While multi-listing also achieves higher throughput than single-listing, it can strikingly underperform single-listing in social welfare. In contrast to the equilibrium, both the social-welfare-maximizing or revenue-maximizing routing policies} of the multi-listing system can be asymmetric across the servers even when the servers are ex-ante symmetric. Relative to the socially or revenue-optimal state, customers under-choose multi-listing in equilibrium when the congestion level is low but may over-multi-list otherwise. The social planner can charge nonnegative, asymmetric prices to restore efficiency and profitability in equilibrium. Our paper provides design guidance for the configuration of multi-server service systems.


    主讲人简介Bio of Speaker:

    Dr.Yichuan Ding (丁弋川) is an Associate Professor at the Desautels Faculty of Management, McGill University, where he holds the title of Desautels Faculty Scholar and serves as the Academic Director of the Global Manufacturing and Supply Chain Management (GMSCM) Master's Program. He earned his Ph.D. in Management Science and Engineering from Stanford University in 2012. Dr. Ding's research focuses on applying operations research and data analytics to enhance the efficiency and equity of healthcare delivery systems. His research has been published in leading journals such asOperations Research, Mathematics of Operations Research, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management (M&SOM), andProduction and Operations Management (POM). His work has been recognized with several honors, including winning the 2023 POMS College of Healthcare Operations Management Best Paper Competition and being named a finalist for the 2019 Pierskalla Best Paper Competition and the 2017 INFORMS Behavioral Operations Management Best Working Paper Competition. Dr. Ding currently serves as an Associate Editor forM&SOM, Service Science, andOperations Research Letters. He co-chaired the 2023 INFORMS MSOM Conference in Montreal. Dr. Ding served as President of the Canadian Operational Research Society (CORS) Queueing and Applied Probability SIG from 2022 to 2024 and currently serves as Vice-President and President-Elect of the CORS Health Care Operational Research SIG.